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‘Ijtihād is a technical term that refers to the exertion of a qualified jurist’s utmost intellectual effort in deriving a legal ruling from the sources of Shariah.’
The following is the response of the Association of Muslim Professionals of South Africa to Ebrahim Rasool’s address at the Inaugural Lecture of The Muslim Thinker and Emeritus Professor Yusef Waghid’s comments on the lecture:
In a recent article published on the Muslim Views website under the headline, ‘Anti-intellectualism and the future of Muslim thought’, Yusef Waghid, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Education at University of Stellenbosch, aligns himself with the views expressed by Ebrahim Rasool in his public address delivered on the occasion of the Inaugural Lecture of The Muslim Thinker in Cape Town on September 29, 2025. In particular, the view that ijtihād should be understood not merely as a juridical concept but as a pedagogical imperative. Both Waghid and Rasool call for the revival of ijtihād as an educational and intellectual practice – one that encourages dissent, critical reasoning, and democratic deliberation within Muslim discourse.
While the call for intellectual rejuvenation within Muslim societies is both timely and necessary, the authors’ conceptual treatment of ijtihād is deeply flawed. Their attempt to broaden ijtihād into a form of critical pedagogy reflects a misunderstanding of its linguistic, juristic, and epistemological foundations.
Ijtihād: A term of juridical precision
In classical Islamic scholarship, ijtihād is a technical term that refers to the exertion of a qualified jurist’s utmost intellectual effort in deriving a legal ruling from the sources of Shariah. Ijtihād is ‘the total exertion of one’s capacity in seeking a legal opinion from the detailed evidences of the law’.
This effort is not arbitrary. It presupposes mastery of Arabic, the Qur’an, the Sunnah, consensus analogy and knowledge of abrogation, as well as an understanding of the higher objectives of the Shariah. Such prerequisites ensure that ijtihād remains a disciplined and guided reasoning process, firmly rooted in revelation.
To equate ijtihād with critical thinking or intellectual freedom – as Waghid and Rasool do – is therefore to strip the term of its scholarly precision and spiritual gravity. Ijtihād is not a synonym for ‘thinking’, nor is every act of independent reflection a form of ijtihād. It is guided exertion in pursuit of divine truth, not mere intellectual speculation.
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The conflation of ijtihād and intellectual dissent
Waghid and Rasool’s use of ijtihād as a metaphor for dissent and pedagogical reform introduces a dangerous conflation between critical engagement and religious reasoning. Their framing suggests that ijtihād can be exercised by anyone deemed ‘critical’ or ‘intellectually engaged’, regardless of their training or grounding in the Islamic sciences.
This approach effectively democratises ijtihād, allowing individuals without any knowledge of usul al-fiqh, Hadith, or Arabic linguistics to assume the interpretive authority historically reserved for qualified scholars (mujtahidun). The inevitable consequence of this flattening of epistemic hierarchy is confusion and fragmentation – each individual becomes their own jurist, free to dissent even from established truths.
Islamic scholarship, by contrast, distinguishes between ijtihād (authoritative reasoning grounded in revelation) and ra’y (mere opinion). The former is bound by divine guidance; the latter, by human conjecture. To erase that distinction under the banner of ‘critical pedagogy’ is to undermine both the sanctity of revelation and the integrity of religious knowledge.
The limits of dissent: Revelation as boundary
Even if one were to concede that ijtihād can extend beyond jurisprudence to moral or social reasoning, this expansion cannot justify dissent in matters already settled by revelation. Islam allows for ijtihād only where the texts are silent or ambiguous – not where revelation has spoken with clarity.
Reason and revelation do not conflict; when they appear to, the error lies in human reasoning, not divine guidance. Thus, the idea that ijtihād entails a ‘pedagogical right to dissent’ on all matters – including those firmly established by Qur’an and Sunnah – is not only methodologically unsound but theologically perilous.
By framing ijtihād as an educational practice of dissent, Waghid and Rasool unintentionally blur the line between legitimate scholarly reasoning and rebellion against revelation. True ijtihād never sanctions contradiction of divine instruction; it operates within the limits of revelation, not outside it.
Intellectual revival: Yes, but name it correctly
None of this is to dismiss the importance of critical thinking or reflective engagement in Muslim education. Indeed, the Qur’an commands tafakkur (reflection), taʿaqqul (rational deliberation), and tadabbur (deep contemplation). These are the Qur’anic terms for intellectual exertion, and they are the rightful descriptors for the kind of thoughtful engagement that Waghid and Rasool wish to promote.
If Muslim educators and thinkers seek an Arabic term for critical pedagogy, tafakkur or taʿaqqul would be accurate and theologically sound. But to use ijtihād – a term denoting a juristic process bound by knowledge, discipline, and revelation – for generic intellectual activity is misleading and academically careless.
The classical understanding of ijtihād
The classical scholars did not classify it as mere critical reflection or educational dissent. For them, ijtihād was a solemn act of devotion, performed by those equipped with both intellectual rigour and spiritual restraint.
Imam Al-Ghazali warns that the unqualified person’s attempt at ijtihād leads to error and misguidance.
It is thus imperative that ijtihād remains within the domain of those who possess sound knowledge of revelation and the principles governing its application. In this classical sense, ijtihād is not a metaphor for thinking – it is a structured process aimed at uncovering the divine will.
Conclusion: Restoring conceptual integrity
The Muslim world does need a revival of intellectual engagement – an awakening from blind imitation and superficial religiosity. But this revival must be built upon tafakkur, taʿaqqul, and tafaqquh – forms of reflection anchored in knowledge and humility; not on the misappropriation of ijtihād.
Ijtihād can, at best, inspire a spirit of disciplined inquiry; it cannot be recast as a democratic tool for dissent or as an academic slogan. If every act of thinking were ijtihād the term would lose its meaning entirely. Intellectual renewal, yes – but not at the expense of conceptual precision or theological coherence.
In short, the future of Muslim thought depends not on redefining ijtihād, but on restoring respect for the intellectual and spiritual conditions that make it possible.
Electronically issued by the Association of Muslim Professionals of South Africa
The YouTube recording of Ebrahim Rasool’s address at The Muslim Thinker inaugural address can be viewed here.
You can read Emeritus Professor Yusef Waghid’s response to Ebrahim Rasool’s lecture here.
