South Africa’s G20 year: multilateralism myths and Africa’s sidelined agenda

South Africa’s G20 year promised bold leadership for Africa but delivered limited gains. From debt crises to climate politics and human-rights contradictions, the summit concluded revealing deep fractures in global multilateralism.

By ASHRAF PATEL

As the G20 leadership summit in Johannesburg concluded on Sunday November 23, views remained sharply divided on its successes and shortcomings in a world marked by geopolitical storms and the rise of Trumpism, which continues to redefine global partnerships and solidarities.

A brief scorecard reveals multiple contradictions and shifting sands that have contributed to the stagnation of Africa’s long-promised global agency.

IFI reform, Africa’s debt crisis and cost-of-capital stagnation

Global finance is the DNA of the G20, and this year’s summit took place as Africa faces one of its most severe debt crises in decades. South Africa’s apparent ‘downgrading’ of the all-important Cost of Capital Commission is widely viewed as a capitulation to creditor nations and ratings agencies. Only South Africa received an S&P ratings upgrade, while not a single African country in debt distress benefited from concessionary treatment. Solidarity? African agency? Clearly not.

The scale of global financial inequality is sobering. Argentina, a fellow G20 member, received a $22 billion IMF bailout – more than the entire African continent combined. Likewise, Ukraine received more development aid from the World Bank than the whole Global South. Ironically, both are among the most neoliberal economies, dependent on global bailouts. The G20 communiqué barely addressed these structural imbalances, and even the UN global tax treaty initiative receded into the background.

Climate change: COP30 Belém sets a contrasting example

While South Africa’s G20 themes were commendable – sustainability, solidarity and climate action – the recommendations were lukewarm and non-committal, particularly regarding resource allocation.

By contrast, Brazil’s COP30 stewardship in Belém offered a model of Global South leadership. Its Mutirão Decision (a Brazilian Portuguese term signalling a collective, community-driven effort) set out clear commitments on climate financing, the integration of indigenous communities in mining regions, combating climate disinformation and establishing mechanisms like the Forever Forest facility.

Brazil and China emerged as the true champions of multilateralism and sustainability, even as major powers and petro-states resisted ambitious climate goals. The EU, too, has backtracked on parts of its COP30 emissions agenda, with European nations scouring Africa and beyond for oil, gas, hydrogen and other resources.

China, meanwhile, has adhered to all its COP30 commitments and NDCs, voluntarily relinquished its WTO Most-Favoured Nation status in an era of US–EU economic nationalism (AGOA, CBAM), and granted duty-free access to all African exports.

Despite the UN Global Digital Compact emphasising information integrity, the G20 failed to include even two words on the subject in its 30-page statement – a glaring omission in an era of digital misinformation and climate denialism. Fortunately, the Belém declaration filled this gap with explicit commitments to combating climate disinformation.

The G20’s red-carpet invitation to the UAE was a glaring contradiction for an institution claiming to champion human rights.

AU peace and security falters amid human rights contradictions

Africa faces multiple armed conflicts – from the DRC and Sudan to Mozambique and the Sahel – many linked to resource extraction zones. In this context, the G20’s red-carpet invitation to the UAE was a glaring contradiction for an institution claiming to champion human rights. The UAE’s alleged funding of rogue RSF forces involved in atrocities in Sudan stands in violation of UN, AU and Geneva Convention frameworks.

The invitation exposes deep inconsistencies within South Africa’s own human-rights-centred foreign-policy narrative, suggesting that the investment agenda trumped Africa’s human rights priorities.

Adding to the contradictions, Canada’s Mark Carney – widely hailed as a global human rights advocate – signed a $70 billion investment agreement with the UAE shortly after the summit. This has fuelled criticism that the G20 in 2025 functioned largely as an investment forum devoid of meaningful human rights commitments (William Shukri, 26 November 2025).

African participation was thin. Even among the few countries invited, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe sent only vice-presidents or lower-level officials. This may signal frustration at the lack of substantive outcomes for Africa’s financial agenda.

Does South Africa deserve its G20 seat? A ‘sub-imperialist’ role?

For many scholars and social-justice activists, the G20 has long been an elite global forum that reinforces structural inequality and exclusion. As South Africa’s term ends, geopolitical tensions persist – highlighted by President Trump’s announcement that South Africa may be ‘disinvited’ from the 2026 US-hosted G20.

South Africa had a historic opportunity to champion Africa’s priorities and secure tangible outcomes such as debt relief. Instead, it operated as a broker for G7 interests, becoming entangled in an EU–US geopolitical spat. The EU emerged as the biggest winner, securing the highest number of invitations and using the momentum to advance its investment agenda at the AU–EU Summit in Angola days later.

By enabling the EU’s renewed entry into Africa, South Africa risks performing the role of a ‘sub-imperialist state’ – much like India in Asia – acting as broker and deal-maker while facilitating extractive ambitions across the continent.

President Trump is not entirely misguided in questioning South Africa’s place in the G20. A non-seat for Africa in 2026 may even be a diplomatic blessing if the G20 continues to ignore African priorities. Rather than endure another costly spat with Washington, South Africa could demonstrate genuine solidarity by ceded its G20 seat to another African nation.

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Ashraf Patel is a senior digital policy researcher at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), specialising in global governance, multilateralism and Africa’s political economy.