Unanswered questions cloud Clover’s halal status

Probe highlights unresolved questions, limited proof and prolonged use of expired certificates

MAHMOOD SANGLAY

A three-months-long Muslim Views investigation into the halal certification of Clover SA products has raised serious questions about trust, transparency, and accountability in South Africa’s halal ecosystem.

The probe reveals a layered and evolving picture: a local certifier withdrawing on principle, a foreign certifier stepping in and later withdrawing, and a digital certification trail that is invalid and inconsistent. At the centre of the inquiry are two main issues of public concern:

whether there is verifiable documentary proof that on-site inspections of Clover’s South African plants were conducted by its former Indian certifier; and
the prolonged use of expired halal certificates and logos on Clover’s digital platforms.

While some facts are established, other key questions remain unresolved.

From local withdrawal to foreign certification

The controversy gathered momentum in October 2023 when the Muslim Judicial Council Halaal Trust (MJCHT) announced that it would no longer certify Israeli goods or Israeli-controlled entities. In line with that policy, the MJCHT withdrew its certification of Clover products with effect from January 1, 2024, citing Clover’s ownership by Milco SA, an Israeli-linked consortium that acquired control of the company in 2019.

A limited run-out period for products already in circulation extended until August 2024, allowing stock bearing MJCHT certification to remain on shelves for a defined period. In the interim, Clover turned to the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind Halal Trust (JUHHT), an India-based certifier, to maintain halal accreditation, particularly for export markets where international certification is often required.

Both Clover and JUHHT have since confirmed that this arrangement also ended, in September 2025, about sixteen months after JUHHT commenced their certification services. This sequence of withdrawal, replacement, and subsequent withdrawal lies at the heart of an issue that has steadily widened in scope and significance.

Local certifiers distance themselves

In parallel, the United Ulama Council of South Africa (UUCSA) convened a meeting of major halal certifiers in November 2023. The meeting included MJCHT, SANHA, NIHT, ICSA and Shura, and resulted in a collective affirmation of a policy not to certify Israeli products.

This position does not explicitly prevent South African certifiers from engaging with Clover itself, hence SANHA and NIHT continue to certify certain Clover products.

However, what emerged clearly, in correspondence with Muslim Views, is that none of the local certifiers had any involvement in Clover’s arrangements with JUHHT. They confirmed that they did not provide any logistical, operational or institutional support for inspections conducted on Clover’s behalf.

This leaves a critical factual premise: JUHHT, which has no permanent operational presence in South Africa, would ordinarily be expected to conduct physical inspections through its own officials or authorised representatives if certification were to be properly grounded.

International halal certifiers providing services to Israeli companies is a matter of growing concern among Palestine activists worldwide. This merits a separate inquiry.

What Clover says

Clover maintains that JUHHT conducted on-site inspections of its plants in South Africa between May and August 2024. In February 2026 the company’s legal secretary, Steven Velthuysen, stated that all Clover products displaying a halal logo are certified, and that Clover has never been found in breach of halal standards.

Velthuysen named two Indian nationals, Niaz Ahmed Farooqui and Mohammad Noman Lateef, as the JUHHT officials who allegedly visited Clover’s plants. He provided specific dates for inspections at facilities in Bloemfontein, Gqeberha, Queensburgh and Clayville. He also indicated that Clover would be willing to provide redacted travel documentation if doubts were raised.

However, in a subsequent response, in March 2026, Clover adopted a different position, saying that the requested documentation could not be disclosed on the grounds of confidentiality, commercial sensitivity, or POPIA constraints. Velthuysen reiterated that Clover has not misled consumers.

What JUHHT says

JUHHT, for its part, confirmed that certification was granted following its standard procedures. In a further response, the organisation stated that its auditors had conducted on-site activities in South Africa. As evidence, JUHHT provided unverifiable supporting material, namely flight details and photographs said to have been taken during the visit.

This photo was submitted by the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind Halal Trust (JUHHT), in New Delhi, and allegedly features two masked JUHHT officials as evidence of inspecting a Clover plant. Legal experts say the photo is unverifiable as proof of inspection.

It is noteworthy that in 2023 JUHHT was named by the National Herald as one of four halal certifiers under investigation for “forged certificates” in India. JUHHT told Muslim Views that it would not engage further.

A conflicting voice and the evidentiary gap

However, a South African theologian from a leading theological institution, shared with Muslim Views a very different version of the arrangement between Clover and JUHHT. The theologian told Muslim Views that around August 2025 he engaged telephonically with the CEO of JUHHT, Niaz Ahmed Farooqui, who acknowledged that JUHHT conducted no on-the-ground inspections of Clover plants in South Africa.

In light of this conflicting account it is even more crucial that verifiable evidence be presented to support the claims of Clover and JUHHT. Muslim Views requested copies passport pages showing port-of-entry stamps, immigration records, site attendance logs, audit reports and formal certification documents specifying the scope and validity of certification.

At the time of publication, none of the above had been provided by Clover or by JUHHT.

Legal and compliance experts consulted during the investigation observed that PNR (Passenger Name Record) codes, even with named passengers, and photographs of masked individuals whose identities and locations cannot be independently confirmed, do not constitute verifiable proof that specified auditors were present at specified facilities. The experts further noted that POPIA does not necessarily prevent the disclosure of appropriately redacted or independently verified documents in matters of significant public interest.

The result is a material evidentiary gap at the centre of the certification process.

Digital evidence of expired certificates

Running parallel to the inspection issue is a second area of concern: Clover’s display of expired halal certificates on its digital platform.

These are two of the thirteen expired MJCHT certificates found on the Clover website during the course of the Muslim Views probe. Although Clover had removed the certificate links, Muslim Views preserved the links and copies of the certificates as part of a trail of digital forensic evidence.

Evidence gathered by Muslim Views shows that at least thirteen MJCHT certificates remained accessible on Clover’s website eight years after they had expired.

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Following queries from Muslim Views in March 2026, Clover removed the MJCHT logos and the embedded certificate links. However, prior to their removal, Muslim Views instructed a legal expert to download and notarise the evidence to preserve its integrity as a digital online record.

The certificates contain explicit conditions limiting their validity to the year of issue, which require their removal after expiry. Yet they remained publicly accessible well beyond those periods.

A broader analysis of Clover’s online certification data compiled by Muslim Views revealed a pattern of irregularities. Expired certificates were still linked to active products, product-certificate mappings were incomplete or inconsistent, and there was no clear distinction between current and historical certification. The effect was a digital environment in which consumers could reasonably form an inaccurate impression about the certification status of products.

Muslim Views put questions to Clover regarding the continued online display of expired certificates dating back to 2018 and 2019, including the absence of any certificates for the period 2020 to 2023.

Clover did not respond to our questions.

Legal practitioners consulted by Muslim Views indicated that the unauthorised use of MJCHT certificates and the display of expired certificates may give rise to issues under consumer protection and intellectual property law. However, any definitive determination would rest with the appropriate authorities or courts.

A flawed system under strain

The issues surrounding inspection evidence and digital certification records point to broader structural challenges within the halal certification system. The system depends fundamentally on trust. Consumers rely on certification marks as assurances that are not easily verified independently.

Where certification transitions occur across multiple bodies, where documentation is not readily verifiable, and where historical certificates remain accessible without clear contextualisation, that trust may be compromised.

For many consumers, the issue reduces to a simple, practical concern: when a halal logo appears on a product, can it be relied upon with confidence?

What the activists say

Imraahn Mukadam (Consumer Action Network)
“Once a halal certificate expires, using it becomes a false trade description. Companies have an active duty to remove outdated certificates from their packaging, websites and online listings, because leaving an expired certificate linked to a product is, in law, no different from actively mislabelling it.”

“Without verifiable, on-the-ground inspection evidence, halal certification claims become functionally meaningless. The current lack of transparency and accountability undermines consumer trust and leaves the system open to exploitation.”

Naazim Adam (Palestine Solidarity Alliance)
“The Clover case exposes a deeper crisis: halal cannot be reduced to a technical stamp while justice, ethics and accountability are sidelined. When local ethical pressure is bypassed through a foreign certifier with limited accountability, it raises serious questions about whether the system is serving consumers—or simply enabling profit at the expense of moral responsibility.”

Did you know?

The UUCSA decision not to trade with Israeli companies or not to certify Israeli goods does not preclude South African certifiers from certifying Clover or companies with Zionist links.
SANHA and NIHT still certify certain Clover products, even after the withdrawal of MJCHT.
Clover is currently also using the certification services of the Halaal Accreditation Council of Africa (HACA) and International Halal Certification (IHC) in the UAE.
The Clover website also displayed kosher certificates that expired in 2020.
Woolworths UHT milk is bottled by Clover, under contract, and certified by SANHA. Such contractual arrangements between manufacturers, retailers and halal certifiers are routine in the food industry.
Halal certification is not regulated by a single national authority in South Africa — multiple independent bodies operate alongside one another, which can result in different certifiers applying their own standards and policies.
Foreign halal certifiers may issue certification for South African companies, particularly for export purposes, even where they do not have a permanent operational presence in the country.

Unanswered Questions

If on-site inspections of Clover’s plants were conducted in 2024, where is the verifiable documentary proof—such as audit reports, site logs, or independently confirmable travel records?
If such documentation exists, why has it not been disclosed, even in redacted or independently verified form, despite repeated requests?
In the absence of verifiable inspection evidence, on what basis was certification granted, and how was compliance assessed?
Why did Clover initially indicate a willingness to provide travel documentation, but later decline to do so?
What explains the continued online display of MJCHT certificates years after their expiry, despite clear conditions requiring their removal?
How are current certification arrangements structured, and which certifier(s) now validate Clover products, at plant and product level?
What mechanisms exist to ensure that certification claims—particularly those made across borders—are independently verifiable and accountable?
More broadly, in a system that relies on trust, who bears responsibility for ensuring that halal certification is transparent, current, and beyond reasonable doubt?