Mendelsohn-Choritz: Why this vindictive action?

HASSEN LORGAT, in a follow up to his earlier article on the SLAPP suit against Megan Choritz, argues that ‘it is ironic that Mendelsohn is litigating the very issues he has built his academic career upon’.

This is a battle of narratives where a man who once stood for diversity and free speech finds himself on the wrong side of history and the struggle for a vibrant and sustainable democracy. Professor Adam Mendelsohn joined the University of Cape Town (UCT) as Director of the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies in 2015. This he combined with the responsibilities of the Isidore and Theresa Cohen Chair in Jewish Civilisation and Head of the Department of Historical Studies. He is a renowned public intellectual who has crafted his arguments on many platforms — academic and popular — but I will look at a few to illustrate his role and arguments.

It is my hope that these will provide insights into the core arguments that Megan Choritz has been issued a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) writ for engaging in. I will list each of the pieces and thereafter distil the issues that were, and remain, up for public discussion and resolution.

In my last piece, I argued that Mendelsohn’s lawsuit against Megan Choritz — triggered by her criticism of his inaugural UCT lecture — constitutes a SLAPP suit. I hinted at, and reiterate, the argument that it is ironic that Mendelsohn is litigating the very issues he has built his academic career upon. For the record, Choritz now faces a summons for R500 000 in damages (R250 000 per claim), plus 10.25 per cent interest, alongside demands for a court-ordered apology and full legal costs, following her critique of his views on Zionism via TikTok and Substack.

In this discussion, I aim to explore how Choritz has engaged over the past decade with themes similar to those raised by Mendelsohn, and how her criticisms of him fit that pattern. Key points of inquiry include criticism of South Africa’s ICJ genocide case against Israel and Mendelsohn’s public rejection of that charge (genocide, principled action, etc.). In addition, he denies that Israel intentionally targets children — amounting to endorsing moral atrocities and Islamophobia. Conversely, these critics have labelled him an anti-Muslim racist and a supporter of genocidal actions, a charge he condemns as antisemitic. Fundamentally, it challenges our understanding of legitimate political dissent and hate speech, as well as the implications of using SLAPPs to close down the exercise of free speech.

1. The 2020 Mendelsohn: A man of principle?

Over a six-year period, we see the evolution of Prof Mendelsohn, from being under attack to now being a defender of Zionism — without any visible self-doubt.

The University of Cape Town’s Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies, in collaboration with an international conference alongside University College London, hosted a webinar on the theme ‘Jews in South Africa: New Directions in Research’. This evoked such a reaction that critics organised a petition against the event because one of the speakers was Mitchel Hunter, from the University of the Western Cape.

All these are contained in the petition organised during late 2020 by Concerned Citizens for Academic Freedom, titled ‘Protect Academic Freedom at the University of Cape Town’. They demanded he be dropped from the programme because he was BDS-aligned and an anti-Zionist.

What is important here is that, in this case, Mendelsohn appeared to have stood up for principle, for which he was roundly condemned. Surprisingly, Milton Shain stood by him, while the SAZF’s Rowan Polovin attacked him thus: ‘We are appalled that a well-respected Jewish institution would deliberately host someone who actively promotes institutional antisemitism by calling for the unique sanction and discrimination of the Jewish state at UCT.’

Mendelsohn rejected the petitioners’ demands to exclude a speaker, arguing that their call for ‘purity tests’ contradicted the principles of academic freedom and rigorous, open debate essential to a university.

2. The fear of a one-state/no-state solution

The second is drawn from an opinion piece in Business Day, entitled ‘Adam Mendelsohn: The SA government uses the language of a no-state solution – Jews fear Pretoria speaks of a two-state solution but really prefers Israel not to exist’, published on November 29, 2023.

Here Mendelsohn writes that ‘by using the language of 75 years of occupation our government affronts much of the SA Jewish community. This community has a deep sense of attachment to Israel and to Zionism. Scholars have long suggested that Zionism has been the civil religion of SA Jews, in some ways more important than Judaism as the glue that kept the community together.’

Mendelsohn cites a survey claiming 90 per cent of South African Jews are attached to Israel and Zionists outnumber non-Zionists by nearly four to one (69 per cent versus 18 per cent).

This leads him to conclude that:

‘They fear that the government mouths words of a two-state solution but prefers a no-state solution. They fear that Zionism has been turned into a term of hate, and this has provided cover for saying outrageous things about Israel and sometimes against Jews. And they are acutely conscious of the government’s silence in response to local agitators who use inflammatory language against Zionists and Zionism. Since most Jews are Zionists, they interpret this as a call for action against themselves, and Jewish institutions.’

It is clear that anyone who represents a challenge to that dominance of Zionists would be challenged, as the government has been. The difference is that the government did not receive a summons.

3. Words and the weaponisation of history

In another opinion piece, published during January 2024, he raised other issues germane to our concerns. It was entitled ‘Adam Mendelsohn: Yes, words matter — and Lamola’s deserve scrutiny.’ The minister’s words about the Israel genocide case and the arguments he makes are troublesome.

In this piece he elaborates on the Israeli lawyers’ views at the ICJ, arguing that words and policy differences regarding genocide matter. This focus on genocide follows an earlier concern — repeated in his lecture — about the supposed casual use of Holocaust analogies to describe Israel’s actions in Gaza against Palestinians.

His reasoning? By comparing the current conflict to the systematic, industrial murder of six million Jews during the Holocaust, he argues this is a gross misrepresentation of history.

He also took issue with the language of occupation, which he says refers to a no-state solution and the withering away of Israel.

For Mendelsohn, South Africa’s case is not a matter of principle, or an obligation upon all nations in terms of the Genocide Convention to address the issue, but a gamble. Why, since 1994, did South Africa take this as a genocide case — and the first one at that for the country? There was no intent to commit genocide, and the war on children — no, he asserted.

He writes:

‘Beginning in the 12th century, Jewish communities in Europe — and less frequently in the Muslim world — were accused of murdering gentile children for ritual purposes. Jews were already pariahs for their religious beliefs and were legally and socially marginalised. These accusations provided licence for terrible violence, for if you can believe that a people seeks to murder children, you can believe anything of them. Such people are an active threat and must be dealt with as such.’

This preposterous defence must be dispensed with here — quickly.

The latest findings of the UN report, called ‘The essence of childhood has been destroyed’: Israel’s deliberate targeting of Palestinian children in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 7 October 2023, document at least 20 179 Palestinian children killed and 44 143 injured by Israeli forces since October 2023.

I will return to this in my critique, but cannot help wondering why the Muslim world was attached to this wagon when the allegation was about murdering gentile children. Unless it is but a slippage to darken the name of Muslims at the altar of this very Christian accusation?

Thus, the claim carries specific, painful weight in Jewish history and likens it to the medieval ‘blood libel’ trope. He also notes that because children made up a significant portion of Holocaust victims, the term ‘genocide’ serves as a deeply disturbing historical echo for the Jewish people.

He ends his article by asserting that if the gamble fails, ‘Lamola’s and SA’s name will be added to a long and sad list of those willing to think the worst of Jews. Words matter, particularly when they come from people in positions of authority. If this charge is ultimately refuted, Lamola’s reputation won’t be saved — even if some of his best friends are Jewish.’

4. In defence of Israel – not resisting racism and antisemitism

In 2025, Mendelsohn publicly challenged UCT Council’s decision to replace the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism with the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA).

His Western Cape High Court application argued that dropping the IHRA definition would weaken the university’s ability to identify antisemitism, particularly when expressed through attacks on Jewish identity and affiliation.

During this process, Mendelsohn was suspended as Head of Historical Studies following colleague complaints about his opposition — highlighting what his supporters call a hostile climate for Jewish academics at UCT.

His camp claims the council pushed the resolution despite warnings of financial and reputational damage, and that the chair withheld key information from members.

The resulting resolutions cost UCT a R200 million donation from the Donald Gordon Foundation and ended Dell Foundation funding for 288 students. Full disclosure, they argue, could have averted the crisis.

Supporters of the JDA counter that the new definition protects academic freedom and legitimate advocacy for Palestinian rights. The JDA explicitly affirms the right to support Palestinian self-determination, oppose Zionism as a form of nationalism, criticise Israel as an apartheid or settler-colonial regime, and advocate boycott, divestment and sanctions, provided such positions are evidence-based and not antisemitic in intent or effect.

Mendelsohn’s legal team went further, with one counsel member describing Israel as ‘evil’, founded on ‘genocide’, and a threat to world peace, arguing categorically that Israel should not exist as a Jewish state. Critics of this position view such language as beyond legitimate critique.

The use of ‘lawfare’ by Zionist supporters appears to be an attempt to reclaim the moral high ground they have lost in the public arena. As Israel and its hasbara (public diplomacy) efforts struggle to win the media debate, they are increasingly relying on legal intervention to silence dissent.

This shift is corroborated by Israeli-US Holocaust scholar Omer Bartov, who argues that Israel’s founding refusal to define its borders or reconcile with Palestinians fundamentally altered the nature of the state, making such criticism not only legitimate but historically necessary.

5. Jewish supremacy or a democratic state for all its citizens?

Fifthly, the inaugural lecture by Mendelsohn — one of many public engagements on issues impacting the liberation of Palestine — took place on April 30, 2026, at the Neville Alexander Building, Auditorium LT1, Lower Campus. It was entitled ‘Where to for the Jews?’

His lecture can be seen on YouTube and read here.

Among others, Megan Choritz was concerned about the lecture and encouraged her comrades to show dissent to his views. Of particular importance is the highly enjoyable and informative Bad Jews Podcast. It is presented by Anthony and Caitlin, who dissect the lecture and provide interesting references to advance the debate.

In this wide-ranging lecture, Mendelsohn attempts to co-opt even anti-Zionists in their support for the Israeli state, ignoring that its formation resulted in the Nakba and the dispossession of Palestinians, leaving them without nationhood or a meaningful life. It was ethnic cleansing and more.

The JDA permits opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism and advocating for various constitutional arrangements for Jews and Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. But asserting this, as Prof Mendelsohn does, means — in his critics’ view — that he supports the genocide.

In other writings, including those quoted above, and in this lecture, Mendelsohn presents the Jewish homeland as unproblematic, almost as victimless and a voluntary abdication by those who lived there.

In addition, he laments that over the last two and a half years we have seen an effort to ‘marginalise most Jews by rendering Zionism beyond the pale, transfiguring an unremarkable idea deeply rooted in Jewish historical experience and religion that Jews should have a homeland of their own into a Frankenstein’s monster imbued with all that is evil. A core element of Jewish identity thereby becomes morally suspect and Zionists are rendered unpeople.’

Furthermore, he quotes favourably the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who recognised this intertwining of fates:

‘Whether praised or censured, revered or berated, the State of Israel and all its works provide the reference point for present-day Jewish identity.’

The issue of Jewish identity is closely tied to a homeland — which, in the literature, is highly contested — and he does not engage with this.

We note his reference to a survey which confirms that the majority support Israel and Zionism in South Africa.

Prof Mendelsohn appears to have overlooked books that speak to the history and context of the dispossession of Palestinians. This took place in 1948, which Ilan Pappé documents in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, where he characterises the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians, the Nakba, as the foundational ‘original sin’ of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There was always opposition to a Jewish takeover and occupation of Palestine — not only from Palestinians. In addition, various Jewish groups, from the historic revolutionary socialist Jewish Bund to religiously oriented groups such as Neturei Karta and Satmar Hasidim, have opposed a Zionist state on religious grounds.

More recently, in support of secular left politics, groups have sprung up to reject a Jewish state on political grounds, including Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), IfNotNow and SA Jews for a Free Palestine.

The main point that emerges here is that these matters are in the public domain and have been engaged directly by Mendelsohn. He thus touches on some of his concerns about anti-Zionism, and those he considers antisemitic, and so on. The Bad Jews Podcast deals in part with similar themes to that of Choritz, albeit in a different format. Amongst other points, they raise questions such as: Do Zionists instrumentalise antisemitism claims?; local antisemitism and Zionist securitisation; saying ‘Zionist’ but meaning ‘Jew’; and others. They also debunk, from experience, the claim that Dr Imtiaz Sooliman of Gift of the Givers is antisemitic, refuting it through the direct experience of one of the hosts.

Islamophobia and the expulsion narrative

In his lecture, he also touches on Islamic and Muslim narratives. Islamophobia — defined by the Muslim Council of Britain as racism targeting perceived Muslimness — manifests in stereotyping, media bias, and attacks on Muslims and their institutions. In addition, it is reflected in media misrepresentation through biased or harmful narratives, as well as workplace discrimination and hostile environments.

This definition will help me to explore Mendelsohn’s supposed Islamophobia. The reader must recall my earlier comment about the murder of gentile children under Christian hegemony, which he clumsily tried to use to smear Muslims.

I now hope, through a discussion emerging from his inaugural lecture on the so-called expulsions of Jewish people from Arab countries, to delve deeper. But I must state upfront: it is simplistic and, at face value, part of an anti-Muslim trope — recycled at will to rewrite history.

This is his opening gambit:

Mendelsohn argues that ‘Islam has its own complicated relationship with Judaism, far less rosy than imagined by those who idealise the treatment of religious minorities in pre-modern Islamic societies. Here too the Jew has been invested with outsized meaning and significance.’

Further, he adds:

‘In some places, that process began before the creation of the state of Israel. In Iraq, for example, many Jews saw the writing on the wall after the infamous Farhud in Baghdad in June 1941, two days of rioting and murderous violence targeting Jews. Forty per cent of Baghdad’s population was Jewish at the beginning of the 20th century. Today a handful of Jews remain in Iraq.’

He raises these points without acknowledging that there are other historical explanations for his views. In addition, he does not provide context. Once Palestinians had been annihilated, depopulated, made refugees and ethnically cleansed, there was a need for new labourers, which in some way led to moves to populate the land with those who could work it. Better still if these labourers were sympathetic or even seen to be Jewish.

This downplaying or suppressing of other factors is itself a reflection of an anti-Muslim bias. But the historical record shows that these expulsions — which took place under colonial rule and, at times, national Arab governments — had the hand of Zionists or their agents.

Ilan Pappé, an Israeli-born historian, challenges the official Israeli narrative that the Israeli regime ‘rescued’ Iraqi Jews from hostile Arab neighbours. He argues instead that their departure — or expulsion, as used by his detractors — was tied directly to Zionist efforts to de-Arabise Jewish communities and populate confiscated land.

In addition, Joseph Massad, in his article, ‘The truth behind Israeli propaganda on the “expulsion” of Arab Jews’, directly rebuts the views of the likes of Mendelsohn, arguing:

‘Contrary to Israeli propaganda that there was a population swap, it is notable that while European and Arab Jews who emigrated to Israel were given the stolen land and properties of expelled Palestinians free of charge, according to Israeli historian Benny Morris and other sources, the Palestinians did not receive the property of the Arab Jews who migrated to Israel.’

As regards the less rosy — or rosy — relationship between Muslims and Jews, his throwaway line was intended to undermine a hopeful vision: moving away from apartheid exclusivism toward an inclusive democratic solution for all.

Tariq Ali, in his Islamic Quintet, writes of a generally close, collaborative relationship between Arabs (and Muslims) and Jews. His books explore medieval multiculturalism, tolerance and historical coexistence. His writings are an important account of the contribution of those considered dark, inferior, the ‘other’, who influenced Western civilisation.

Many others have taken this view. Michael Young, in ‘When Jews Were Arabs Too’, speaks of a more nuanced existence before the forces of Israel entered the debate. His review of the book by Iraqi Jewish historian Avi Shlaim, When Jews Were Arabs Too, delves further into these complexities, far away from the one-liners of Mendelsohn.

Finally, Naeim Giladi, in his autobiographical article and historical analysis titled ‘The Jews of Iraq, writes:

‘About 125 000 Jews left Iraq for Israel in the late 1940s and into 1952, most because they had been lied to and put into a panic by what I came to learn were Zionist bombs. But my mother and father were among the 6,000 who did not go to Israel. Although physically I never did return to Iraq — that bridge had been burned in any event — my heart has made the journey there many, many times. My father had it right …’

The above critiques — especially those of Giladi and others — explain how the new Israeli entity absorbed the Mizrahi (Arab) Jews. They detail how the Iraqi immigrants, along with other communities from the Islamic world, did not have a rosy experience, as they often faced severe marginalisation and were placed in difficult, peripheral living conditions once they arrived in Israel.

Recent research confirms what Bartov, quoted here, says: that Zionism — a ‘settler-colonial, ethno-national movement’ — aimed from its inception to ‘eliminate, uproot, murder the Palestinians’.

Today, Israel is a racial hierarchy that places Ashkenazi Jews at the top and Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews at the bottom (just above Palestinians), and they are treated accordingly. Palestinians, overwhelmingly Muslim, are at the bottom rung.

The genocide against Palestinians: Systematic destruction

To further explore the criticism of Islamophobia, we must revisit South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel. The core of this argument is that Israel’s actions are not merely military operations but a systematic destruction of Palestinian heritage, national identity and religious life.

Because Palestinians are a predominantly Muslim population, the targeting of their cultural and religious institutions is inextricably linked to their identity as a protected ‘national, racial, and ethnical group’ under the Genocide Convention.

I believe the failure to condemn the destruction of the people and their institutions makes one complicit in these crimes and arguably endorses a specific Islamophobic dimension of genocide.

The scale of destruction

Mosques and churches: According to reports from the past year, approximately 79 per cent to 90 per cent of all mosques in the Gaza Strip — totalling between 800 and 1 000 sites — have been damaged or destroyed. Additionally, at least three historic Christian churches have suffered significant damage.

Targeting religious leadership: Gaza’s Ministry of Endowments reports that between 230 and 300 religious scholars, clerics and imams have been killed during the ongoing offensive.

Cultural heritage: The damage extends to the most significant historical landmarks in Gaza, including the Great Omari Mosque — the largest and oldest in Gaza (1 400 years old) — which had its minaret destroyed and its structure severely compromised.

Significant damage has also been reported at the Sayed al-Hashim Mosque, the Katib al-Wilaya Mosque, Saint Porphyrius Church (the oldest in Gaza and the third oldest globally), and the Holy Family Church.

By framing these attacks as an assault on Palestinians, their religion and their national identity, South Africa’s ICJ case highlights how the destruction of physical infrastructure is intended to erase the Palestinian presence and history itself.

Sadly, the work of destroying what remains of Palestinian lands also appears to be a space where Israeli bulldozers roam freely in attempts to ethnically cleanse and uproot Palestinian existence. Their methods are a continuation of ecocide and genocide, as the regime tries to erase any evidence of its ethnic cleansing and war crimes.

The work of the organisation Forensic Architecture, and its director, the Israeli-born architect and activist Eyal Weizman, has done much to document these settler-colonial strategies, now also presented in a new book.

On calling it a genocide

Mendelsohn adheres to a strict legal definition, debunking South Africa’s case on the necessity of proving ‘specific intent’ (deliberately seeking to destroy a group), as required by the Genocide Convention, which he feels South Africa has not adequately shown.

In this regard, he stands in stark contrast to various NGOs and the UN Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, which have defined what has emerged in Gaza after October 7, 2023, as a genocide.

The Lemkin Institute criticised those who only later came around to describing Israel’s actions as genocide, but clearly Mendelsohn is not yet there.

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention and Human Security outlined four key reasons why this is happening:

• genocide is a process, not merely mass murder, and early identification is crucial for prevention;
• Israel’s genocidal intent and actions span all of Palestine, not just Gaza’s famine;
• Western academic and institutional arrogance has long gatekept the term, marginalising victims and enabling complicity; and
• ordinary global citizens, particularly from the Global South and Western youth, have consistently demonstrated greater courage and clarity in identifying genocide than formal Western organisations.

It committed itself to establishing ‘new genocide prevention institutions and mechanisms, ones that exist outside of the hands of the UN, most of its member states, and Western elites’.

It concludes:

‘Until then, the Lemkin Institute commits itself to ensuring that the world neither forgets nor gets away with the 2023–2025 genocide against the Palestinians.’

Unlike Mendelsohn, they view the genocide accusation against Israel as a necessary diagnosis, based on facts on the ground and necessary to prevent further death. Their focus is on the ‘failure to act’ and the ideological or language-framing ‘gatekeeping’ that has delayed international recognition of what they see as an undeniable truth.

The Lemkin Institute, unlike the professor, believes that Israel has a case to answer, and that the perpetration of an ‘incremental genocide’ — though not their own term — has been evident for years.

Conclusion

To conclude, I return to Mendelsohn’s inaugural lecture, when he laments the epoch we are living in as one where ‘extraordinary illiberalism, intolerance and ugliness’ are present, and where ‘representatives of Israel’ are ‘somehow responsible for its actions’.

These actions are meted out against those who are ‘voicing dissent, for exercising the right to disagree’.

He further asserts that this tendency has engulfed the whole country, ending with this question:

‘Is there no room for disagreement, or even for expressing a contrary opinion?’

This question now lies forcefully at his door, and I cannot help wondering why this progressive Jewish dissenter has been targeted out of all his critics.

I have also been at pains to find any criticism by the professor of Israel’s actions. Can any person of faith — compassionate and caring — explain why they do not condemn this?

All of the above begs the question: where is the man who stood up against these purity tests six years ago?

Hassen Lorgat, trade unionist and media activist, is a member of the Working Group on Data Centres and convenor of the CSOs Tailings Working Group. He writes in his personal capacity.