![Why becoming a wealthy Muslim is commendable in Islam [+videos]](https://muslimviews.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Muslim-Trade-Business-1-360x180.webp)
![Does ta’wīl mean interpretation or fulfilment? A Quranic reassessment [+video]](https://muslimviews.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Tawil-Kaskas-360x180.webp)
How South Africa’s elite consensus is weaponising scandal to entrench coalition rule
By MPHUTLANE WA BOFELO
The sudden eruption of outrage over alleged collusion between government officials and criminal networks – particularly regarding the illicit proliferation of drugs now under scrutiny by the Madlanga Commission – reveals less about a newfound commitment to justice and more about a strategic recalibration of elite power.
For years, civil society and grassroots voices have raised alarms about systemic corruption and complicity, only to be met with silence or dismissal. Now, with whistleblowers like General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi thrust into the spotlight, the political establishment is seizing the moment – not to dismantle entrenched rot, but to repackage it under the banner of coalition governance.
This is not a reckoning; it is a rebranding. And at its core lies a calculated effort to preserve elite consensus, neutralise transformative alternatives, and institutionalise a Government of National Unity (GNU) as a permanent feature of South Africa’s political landscape.
Historically, the Transitional Executive Act of 1993 was anchored in three core principles demanded by the National Party: power-sharing, the guarantee of minority rights, and the protection of property rights. These were deemed non-negotiable during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and shaped the constitutional framework that followed.
The ANC’s acceptance of the Sunset Clause enabled the embedding of these principles in the Interim Government and, subsequently, the 1994 GNU. This arrangement also included guarantees for regional interests – a concession aimed at placating the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which advocated for a federalist state. One consequence of this compromise was the establishment of nine provincial governments – an arguably excessive and costly structure. It is plausible that the ANC’s agreement to this model was driven not only by constitutional negotiations but also by its interest in expanding political career opportunities for its cadres and embedding patronage networks within provincial administrations.
You may also want to read
the ANC elite may have long harboured ambitions to institutionalise the GNU as a long-term political arrangement
While F W De Klerk and the National Party openly championed these principles as permanent features of the post-1994 constitutional order, the ANC presented them as temporary measures for a smooth transition. One could argue that the ANC leadership was not fundamentally opposed to institutionalising power-sharing, minority rights, and property protections, but feared that openly endorsing these principles too early could erode its popular support. This context helps explain the ANC’s rhetorical pivot following its poor performance in the 2021 elections. The party swiftly adopted the narrative that the electorate had mandated a co-governance model, thereby reviving the idea of a GNU. This suggests that the ANC elite may have long harboured ambitions to institutionalise the GNU as a long-term political arrangement, waiting only for the right moment.
Ironically, the ANC’s own misgovernance and failure to translate political power into meaningful development and transformation have contributed to growing public support for coalition governance. For conservatives and liberals alike, the goal is not merely to prevent the ANC from regaining dominant control, but to forestall the rise of a leftist, pro-Black alternative that could harness state power for genuine socio-economic transformation.
It remains too early to determine whether General Mkhwanazi and Lieutenant-General Fannie Masemola embody incorruptible moral leadership or whether they too may be entangled in the very systems they now expose. What is clear, however, is that this scandal may be strategically mobilised – not to cleanse the state, but to consolidate elite control under the guise of reform.
Ultimately, this reflects a deeper anxiety among South Africa’s political elite. There is a palpable fear of mass insurrection, a grassroots-driven revolutionary movement, and the emergence of ethical leadership from outside the established political order. In other words, mainstream political institutions and movements are more likely to use this moment to preserve elite consensus and suppress transformative change than to champion meaningful development and justice.
Mphutlane wa Bofelo is a political theorist who focuses on the interface between politics, governance and development.
